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Abstract
For my undergraduate thesis, I conducted research on the topic of carbon taxes. Specifically, I was interested in the possible existence of a double dividend effect as a method for
making this public policy option more palatable to a broader audience. To that end, I first
conducted a literature review on the subject, then did an empirical analysis. I chose Nebraska as the subject of my analysis because it is my home state and I experienced heated
debates over tax policy firsthand as a Page for the State Legislature. To see whether a
double dividend would exist in Nebraska, I used a simple computable general equilibrium
model to model three different scenarios for offsetting a carbon tax: lump-sum payments,
reductions in taxes on labor, and reductions in taxes on capital. While my knowledge and
resources presented some large limitations, I still found interesting results. Lump-sum
payments and reductions in taxes on labor show the same increase in welfare, but the
latter is much less distortionary. However, reducing taxes on capital shows by the far the
best outcome, as I find a larger increase in welfare, and very limited distortionary effects.
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1 Introduction
We constantly hear in the news about how climate change is beginning to wreak havoc
on almost all aspects of human life. Longer-lasting droughts, more frequent flooding,
stronger storms, and crop failure—these are just a few of the current and future ramifications of climate change, especially if it continues unabated. Climate scientists are
unanimous in the consensus that the planet is warming. Since 1880, global temperature
has risen 1.9 degrees Fahrenheit. Not only that, they also agree that this change is mostly
anthropogenic, or caused by humans. Cook et al. (2016) found in a wide-ranging review
of literature and surveys that 90-100 of climate scientists agree that climate change is
anthropogenic. Warming temperatures could have a devastating impact on the species
that have driven them, if left unchecked.
As this paper is focused on the economics of climate change, it is appropriate to
look at the some of the predicted economic effects. If the current situation continues,
the future could be quite bleak for humanity. Some key areas of risk resulting from
warming temperatures are agriculture, natural disasters, and human health. Probably
most relevant to the state of Nebraska—the focus of this analysis—is agriculture. This
sector is undoubtedly the most critical in the Nebraskan economy, with the state placing in
the top echelon nationwide for production of corn, soybeans, beef, and other agricultural
products. While Deschenes and Greenstone (2007) find little net effect for U.S. agriculture
as a result of climate change, there is considerable variability by state. They project
Nebraska to be one of the biggest losers after California, to the tune of 670 million loss in
annual profits. Increased flooding and severe weather activity could also become problems
for the state in the future.
Given these facts, many people are naturally interested in what can be done to stymie,
if not reverse the Earth’s rising temperature. Proposed solutions run the gambit of public
and private, feasible and infeasible. Groups in both Europe and the United States have
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proposed sweeping legislation to completely re-work economies and gear them toward
the challenge of fighting climate change. World governments signed the Paris Accords in
2016 with the goal of limiting the global temperature rise to 2 degrees Celsius. Private
enterprises have come up with ideas to technologically alter Earth’s atmosphere or deal
with the effects. What all of these solutions have in common is grand notions about the
ability of a single idea to wildly alter the course of history, either through the ingenuity
of an as-yet-undiscovered entrepreneur or the wisdom of government planners. There is a
third way, however, that is widely endorsed by economists. That way is a tax on carbon
emissions. With a tax on carbon emissions, governments could subtly nudge industry and
consumers to alter their behavior in ways that reduce emissions of greenhouse gas, while
being as non-disruptive as possible.
Not only would a carbon tax alleviate greenhouse gas emissions, it would also have the
potential to be revenue neutral. Economists call this phenomenon the double dividend
effect. Basically, policymakers would impose a carbon tax, while also reducing some
other, more distortionary tax. This policy move should lead to an increase in efficiency,
as carbon taxes are an example of a Pigouvian tax, which are levied on markets that
produce negative externalities, in this case, carbon dioxide. Scholars might study any large
number of issues relating to carbon taxes. These include regressiveness, implementation,
and whether the carbon tax does indeed reduce carbon emissions (its chief aim). For the
purposes of this paper, I assume that the carbon tax will not be regressive and that it
does indeed reduce carbon emissions. Different implementations will be considered when
simulating the tax’s effects. The primary goal is to assess whether a double dividend
effect exists for a carbon tax implemented in the state of Nebraska.
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2 Literature Review
As a result of extensive reading on the topic, I have compiled a brief literature review
which summarizes the main points of research into double dividends. The most important
distinction that I found is the concept of ”weak” and ”strong” versions. The second is
that different policy offsets of carbon taxes give widely varied results with respect to the
double dividend. Goulder (1994) explains that in the weak form, cost savings are realized
if the government uses revenue from the carbon tax to cut other, more distortionary
taxes. He also recognizes an intermediate form, in which there exists a distortionary
tax, which, when offset by the carbon tax, allows zero or negative gross costs. Finally,
the strong form occurs when a zero or negative gross cost is realized for an ”average”
distortionary tax. For purposes of my later analysis, I mostly combine the intermediate
and strong forms together, since lack of precision does not allow me to decompose all
the way down to specific taxes. The rest of this literature review will be broken down
into three sections: general research on carbon taxes, research on enacted or proposed
carbon taxes in countries, and research on carbon taxes in NUTS-1 regions of countries
(e.g. states, provinces).
First, we have some broad overview. Freire-González (2018) analyzed 66 different
simulations from 40 studies on this topic. They found that in 55% of these simulations,
a strong double dividend was found. Importantly, they also noted that offsetting environmental taxes with cuts in capital taxes was the most likely scenario to exhibit the
double dividend. Haites et al. (2018) found that, while carbon taxes do have an effect in
mitigating emissions, a double dividend is often not seen, although this could be partially
down to implementation issues. These two studies bring up another important concept
in my reading—that taxes on capital tend to be more distortionary than those on labor,
and therefore we are more likely to see the double dividend effect if we offset carbon taxes
with capital taxes.
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Many scholars have also looked at the specific results of carbon taxes which have been
implemented or could be implemented in different countries. Certain of these results
are reported here. First, I look at some studies of large contries and political unions.
Proost and Regemorter (1992) analyzed the introduction of a carbon-energy tax in the
European Community. They found that the strong form of the double dividend did not
exist, and also that efficiency losses actually occurred, if one does not take into account
the environmental benefits. Babiker et al. (2002) looked into the possiblility of a double
dividend in the U.S. and European countries. They found that labor must be extremely
elastic for the strong form to be present, while also noting that since European countries
already have high energy taxes, a double dividend is less likely there. Glomm et al. (2005)
investigated the potential effects of a carbon tax in the United States. They concluded
that the increase in welfare resulting from green taxes is small, but that there is a large
efficiency gain as a result of reducing capital taxes. Takeda (2007) conducted a study for
Japan, noticing a weak double dividend effect in all scenarios, but a strong effect when
the carbon tax was offset by reductions in capital taxes. Orlov et al. (2013) studied a
possible carbon tax in Russia. They found, unlike some of these other studies, that a
strong double dividend could exist when labor taxes were reduced, but that this depends
heavily on labor supply elasticity. Finally, a recent paper by Metcalf and Stock (2019)
detailed through a regression analysis how a carbon tax could be implemented and not
significantly impact the economy in a negative way. These studies in large countries (or
groups of countries, in the case of the European Community) are instructive, but it is
possible that they are not as relevant as we might wish to a small, open economy like
Nebraska.
This next section will look at carbon tax studies in several countries, as well as two
Canadian provinces. First of all, Robson (2014) holds up Australia as an example of
what not to do when implementing a carbon tax. Conefrey et al. (2013a) studied a
possible carbon tax in the country of Ireland. They found that a double dividend would
6

exist if income taxes were reduced, but not in the case of lump sum payments to the
populace. A very similar situation was found by Allan et al. (2014a) with Scotland,
with the important caveat the revenue would need to be recycled within Scotland, rather
than the United Kingdom as a whole. Looking at Taiwan, Bor and Huang (2010) found a
double dividend in the scenarios where a carbon tax was combined with a personal income
tax or business income tax reduction. Kiuila and Markandya (2009) write that in their
research on Estonia, the best economic outlook resulted when they recycled the revenue
from a theoretical carbon tax to environmental protection programs, leading to increased
employment, and thus, consumer welfare. Closer to home, Landa Rivera et al. (2016) find
that both environmental benefits and economic growth can be achieved when recycling
revenues from an energy tax in Mexico. In the Canadian province of Saskatchewan, Liu
et al. (2018) found that a carbon tax could be beneficial for the environment, but that it
would be bad for resource-driven economy of that province. On the other hand, British
Columbia’s law has been shown by Murray and Rivers (2015) to have reduced carbon
emissions and provided some form of double dividend.
It can therefore be seen that the literature supports a view that carbon taxes can very
well achieve a double dividend effect in certain cases. Well-implemented public policy
can both protect the environment and create more efficiency in the economy, with less
disruption than other solutions. But can it work everywhere?

3 Methodology
The second portion of this thesis seeks to identify whether a carbon tax, applied in
the state of Nebraska, would potentially exhibit the double dividend effect. To that
end, I constructed a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. This simple model
makes many assumptions about the nature of real-world economic activity but nonetheless
achieves results that make good economic sense and which more experienced researchers
7

could easily corroborate. In the next few subsections, an overview is given of the data and
the equations used to construct the model. I used the free demo version of the computer
software program General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS). I also based my model
off an example model available in GAMS documentation, tweaking it for my analysis and
data needs.

3.1 Computable General Equilibrium Model
3.1.1 Domestic Production
The first set of equations in the Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model is domestic production. These equations describe how intermediate inputs and factors are used to
produce output across sectors of the economy.
Y j = bj

Q

β

Fh,jh,j

(1)

(1) is the composite factor equation. Yj represents the composite factor. bj is the scale
parameter in the production function, Fh,j is the hth factor input by the j th sector, and
βh,j represents the share parameter.
Yj
Fh,j = βh,j pyj pf
h

(2)

Next, (2) shows the factor demand function. Fh,j is the demand for the hth by the j th
sector. pyj is the composite factor price and pfj is the factor price.
Xi,j = axi,j Zj

(3)

(3) exhibits the intermediate demand function, where Xi,j is the intermediate input into
the ith sector by the j th sector. Furthermore, axi,j is the intermediate input requirement
coefficient and Zj is the output from the j th sector.
Yj = ayj Zj

(4)
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Equation (4) shows the composite factor demand function. Yj represents the composite
factor, while ayj shows the composite factor input requirement coefficient.
pzj = ayj pyj +

P

axi,j pqi

(5)

The last of the domestic production equations is (5), the unit cost function. Here, pzj
and pqi represent the supply price of the it h good and Armington’s composite good price,
respectively.
3.1.2 Government Behavior
The next set of equations we look at display government behavior in the model. This is
particularly important given the subject of study.
Td = τd

P

pfh F Fh

(6)

Government behavior begins with equation (6). τ d shows the direct tax by the government
on households. F Fh is the factor endowment of the ht h factor, and pfh is its price.
T z = τ zj pzj Zj

(7)

In equation (7), τ zj is the tax rate on capital. It includes both the existing taxes on
businesses in Nebraska, as well as the theoretical carbon tax being assessed in the model.
T m = τ mi pmi Mi

(8)

Equation (8) shows revenue from tariffs. It is not really used in the model, as U.S. states
cannot levy tariffs, but it is included for the sake of completeness.
Xgi = µi

T d+

P

P

T zj +
pqi

T mj −Sg

(9)

This equation displays the government spending in the ith sector. µ represents government
spending in the ith sector as a share of total government spending, which is then multiplied
by the sum of all government revenues, minus government saving.
9

3.1.3 Investment Behavior
This next section deals with investment in the model economy. It shows the total amount
of investment in different sectors, as well as government and private saving.
Xv = λi Sp+Sg+Sf
pqi

(10)

Equation (10) models the total investment demand in the Nebraskan economy. λi is the
share of total investment in the economy in the ith sector. λ is then multiplied by the
sum of all saving in the economy, divided by the price of Armington’s composite good
(see page 14).
Sp = ssp

P

pfh F Fh

(11)

Equation (11) deals with private saving. The average propensity for private saving, ssp, is
multiplied by the sum of the price of the hth multiplied by the endowment of that factor.
Sg = ssg(T d +

P

T zj +

P

T mj )

(12)

Similarly to the previous equation, (12) deals with saving, this time that of the government. Average propensity for government saving is multiplied by the sum of all tax
revenue that the government receives.
Xp = αi

P

pfh F Fh −Sp−T d
pqi

(13)

Last of all in the investment behavior section, we have household consumption. Elasticity
of substitution for the it h good is multipled by the sum of the price of each factor multiplied
by the endowment of said factor, minus private saving and income tax, diivided by the
price of Armington’s composite good.
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3.1.4 International Trade
Although international trade does not figure heavily into this particular model, it is still
included for the sake of completeness.
pei = pW ei

(14)

The purpose of equation (14) is merely to set the export price of the ith good in the local
currency, pei , equal to the world price, pW ei , with the help of the exchange rate .
pmi = pW mi

(15)

Equation (15) is similar to (14), but for the import price of the ith good, rather than the
export price.
P

pW ei Ei + Sf =

P

pW mi Mi

(16)

Equation (16) merely ensures that the sum of the value of all exports Ei , plus foreign
saving Sf , is equal to the sum of the value of all imports.
3.1.5 Armington Function
The elasticity of substitution in this model is based on the Armington function. It is a
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) model that says the only difference between local
and foreign goods for consumers is that they were produced in different places (CITE).
While this is quite simplistic, it is not so important when making such a simple model,
especially of an individual U.S. state.
1

Qi = γi (δmi Miηi + δdi Diηi ) ηi

(17)

Equation (17) determines the Armington composite good for the it h sector. γi denotes
the scale factor for the it h sector. δmi and δdi show, respectively, the share parameter in
the Armington function for the foreign Mi and local Di goods. Mi and Di are raised to
ηi , the parameter for elasticity of substitution.
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η

Mi =

γi i δmi pqi
(1+τ mi )pmi

1
1−ηi

Qi

(18)

Equation (18) shows the calculation for the value of imports in the ith sector.
η

Di =

γi i δdi pqi
pdi

1
1−ηi

Qi

(19)

Similarly to above, (19) shows the calculation for the value of domestic goods in the ith
sector.

3.1.6 Transformation Function
The transformation function equations are very similar to the Armington function, except
that they deal with the supply of goods, rather than the demand.
1

Zi = θi (xiei Eiφi + xidi Diφi ) phii

(20)

Equation (20) deals with the output of the it h sector, Zi . xiei is the export share parameter in the transformation function, while xidi is the parameter for the domestic good. φ
is the transformation elasticity parameter.
φ

Ei = (

1
θi i xiei (1+τ zi )pzi 1−φ
) i Zi
pei

(21)

Next is the calculation for exports. θi is the scale parameter for the transformation
function. Without going too much into details, equation (21) determines what fraction of
the total output of the ith sector is exported.
φ

Di = (

1
θi i xidi (1+τ zi )pzi 1−φ
) i Zi
pdi

(22)

Just like equation (21), equation (22) is the fraction of the total output that remains in
state for domestic consumption.
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3.1.7 Market Clearing Conditions
Qi = Xpi + Xgi + Xvi +

P

(Xi,j

(23)

The purpose of the market clearing condition in equation (23) is to make sure that there
is no excess demand or supply for the goods produced by the ith sector.
P

Fh,j = F Fh

(24)

The purpose of the market clearing condition in equation (24) is to make sure that there
is no excess demand or supply for the factors supplied by the household.
3.1.8 Utility Function
U tility =

Q

Xpi αi

(25)

Equation (25) details a fictitious utility objective that is useful for determining if some
change to the economy will increase or decrease the well-being of its members.

3.2 Data
Finding good data constituted one of the most difficult aspects of this research. In the
end, I used data supplied by an adviser. It represented the Nebraskan economy in a social
accounting matrix (SAM) with twenty-six production sectors, two factors of production,
nine household brackets, one investment sector, twenty tax sectors (local, state, and
government), thirteen government services sectors, and a rest of world sector. In order
to fit this data into the constraints of the GAMS demo version and my beginner CGE
knowledge, I aggregated this data into seven production sectors, two factors of production,
one household bracket, one investment sector, one indirect tax sector, one government
services sector, and a rest of the world sector. The seven production sectors are as follows:
manufacturing, utilities, transportation, private services, commercial, and miscellaneousnon-emissions-producing. Another issue with this data is that it is dated (from 2004).
13

Figure 1: Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for Nebraska
This constraint is unfortunate, but something I had to work with due to constraints
on resources. I think that my findings are certainly interesting enough to justify more
research on the topic in the future. Below is a representation of the SAM I used for my
analysis.

4 Results
In order to assess whether a double dividend effect would be seen if Nebraska levied
a carbon tax, I modelled three different scenarios. In each, the government imposes a
relatively modest carbon tax of $10 per ton of carbon emissions. However, I made the tax
revenue-neutral in a different way for each scenario. In the first, the state merely sends
the revenue from the carbon tax to households in the form of lump sum payments. In
the second, I offset the carbon tax with an equal cut in direct labor taxes on households.
Finally, in the third scenario, the state cuts taxes on capital in order to offset the new
carbon tax. In the following tables, I summarize the results of these simulations. Some
key indicators are observed: change in production, household consumption, government
spending, investment demand, exports, and imports in each sector of the economy, as
well as changes in government and private saving, and the overall increase or decrease in
14

consumer welfare.

4.1 Scenario One
The first scenario to be assessed is lump-sum payments. In this simulation, the government
assesses the $10 per ton carbon tax on every sector of the economy. The state offsets this
gain in revenue by an equivalent cut in labor taxes on the household. Tables 1 and 2
summarize the results of this simulation in selected indicators.
Table 1: $10 per ton carbon tax with lump-sum payout
Misc.

Manuf.

Trans.

Utilit.

Commer.

Services

%∆Labor

-0.429

-0.665

-0.565

0.944

0.370

0.395

%∆Capital

-0.271

-0.507

-0.407

-0.786

0.530

0.555

%∆P roduction

-0.298

-0.615

-0.512

-0.835

0.417

0.446

%∆HouseholdConsumption

1.537

1.503

1.478

1.510

1.489

1.495

%∆GovernmentSpending

-7.120

-7.151

-7.173

-7.144

-7.163

-7.158

%∆InvestmentDemand

-0.037

-0.070

-0.095

-0.063

-0.084

-0.078

%∆Exports

-0.214

-0.584

-0.495

-0.764

0.430

0.465

%∆Imports

-0.552

-0.704

-0.556

-0.948

0.402

0.417
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Table 2: Saving, $10 per ton carbon tax with lump-sum payout
Change
%∆P rivateSaving

0.061

%∆GovernmentSaving

0.153

First of all, this scenario shows consumers realizing a 1.51% increase in welfare. Therefore, it does seem to meet the threshold for a weak double dividend. In the usage of factors
of production the miscellaneous non-carbon sector, manufacturing, and transportation experience decreases, while factor usage in the commercial and services sectors increases.
Most interestingly, payments to labor increase by almost an entire percentage point and
payments to capital decrease slightly less in utilities. This could reflect a reality in which
the carbon tax causes less capital to be used in the production of electrical power, but
more labor is needed to meet demand. Following on from the trends in payments to
factors, production in the first four sectors also falls, while production in services and
commercial increases. The same is true for exports and imports. This results makes sense
for exports, but it would seem like the opposite should be true for imports. Household
consumption rises across the board—likely a result of the lump-sum tax putting more
disposable income in consumers’ pockets. Government spending, on the other hand, drastically decreases for some reason. This could possibly be due to the model not adequately
capturing the effect of the policy change on government behavior. Investment demand
slightly falls for all sectors as well.

4.2 Scenario Two
Under scenario two, the government assesses the $10 per ton carbon tax on every sector
of the economy. Instead of recycling revenue by a one-time payment to consumers, there
16

will be a cut in labor taxes, the most obvious of which would be state income tax. Tables
3 and 4 summarize the results of this simulation in selected indicators.
Table 3: $10 per ton carbon tax with labor tax reduction (all percentages)
Misc.

Manuf.

Trans.

Utilit.

Commer.

Services

%∆Labor

-0.457

-0.866

-0.748

-0.431

0.325

0.531

%∆Capital

-0.324

-0.733

-0.615

-0.298

0.459

0.666

%∆P roduction

-0.347

-0.824

-0.703

-0.339

0.363

0.574

%∆HouseholdConsumption

1.530

1.501

1.479

1.504

1.489

1.495

%∆GovernmentSpending

-3.385

-3.413

-3.434

-3.409

-3.424

-3.419

%∆InvestmentDemand

-2.419

-2.448

-2.469

-2.444

-2.459

-2.454

%∆Exports

-0.268

-0.790

-0.681

-0.271

0.384

0.600

%∆Imports

-0.586

-0.923

-0.762

-0.447

0.342

0.535

Table 4: Saving, $10 per ton carbon tax with labor tax reduction
Change
%∆P rivateSaving

-0.051

%∆GovernmentSaving

-3.541

17

There is an increase in consumer welfare under this scenario, and oddly enough, it is the
exact same as that in scenario one: 1.51%. In fact, many of the results of this simulation
line up closely to the lump-sum payment method. Payments to labor and capital decrease
in the non-carbon miscellaneous, manufacturing, transportation, and utilities sectors.
They increase in the commercial and services sectors. These changes correspond again
with those of production, exports, and imports. The increase in household consumption
is about the same as in Scenario One. Similarly to Scenario One, government spending
decreases, but although they are significant decreases, they are still about half of those in
Scenario One. On the other hand, the decrease in investment demand is more severe in
Scenario Two.

4.3 Scenario Three
Under scenario three, the government assesses the $10 per ton carbon tax on every sector
of the economy. This time, the carbon tax is offset with reductions in capital taxes, with
each sector received equal relief. Tables 5 and 6 summarize the results of this simulation
in selected indicators.

18

Table 5: $10 per ton carbon tax with capital tax reduction (all percentages)
Misc.

Manuf.

Trans.

Utilit.

Commer.

Services

%∆Labor

-0.004

-0.005

-0.008

-0.006

-0.006

0.007

%∆Capital

-0.003

-0.004

-0.007

-0.005

-0.005

0.009

%∆P roduction

-0.003

-0.005

-0.008

-0.005

-0.006

0.008

%∆HouseholdConsumption

-0.021

-0.016

-0.034

-0.037

-0.014

-0.009

%∆GovernmentSpending

0.077

0.082

0.064

0.061

0.084

0.089

%∆InvestmentDemand

-0.015

-0.010

-0.028

-0.032

-0.009

-0.003

%∆Exports

-0.003

-0.009

-0.007

-0.009

0.003

0.021

%∆Imports

-0.005

0.005

-0.009

0.000

-0.016

-0.012

Table 6: Saving under the capital tax scenario
Change
%∆P rivateSaving

0.000

%∆GovernmentSaving

0.005

Consumers realize the largest gain in welfare under the capital tax scenario: 4.86%.
Furthermore, most of the increases and decreases across the different sectors were very
small, indicating that the tax reform is not too disruptive. With regard to payments
in labor and capital, all sectors but services see a decrease. A similar situation is seen
with production. For exports and imports, the same trends are seen as in the previous
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scenarios although, again, with much smaller changes. Household consumption descreases
slightly, which makes sense since the household does not see any direct gain from the policy
change. Government spending rises across the board, and these are the largest increases
of the simulation, although still much smaller than those seen earlier. Investment demand
also has small decreases in all sectors, which is a little strange, considering the greater
availability of capital. Finally, there zero change in private saving and a very small increase
in government saving.

5 Conclusions
Somewhat surpringly, all of the scenarios in this analysis exhibited an increase in welfare,
and therefore a double dividend effect. However, Scenarios One and Two also show some
more distortionary effects on different areas of the economy. In a reflection of what I find
in the literature on the topic, offsetting a new carbon tax with decreases in capital-based
taxes seems to be the smartest move. In Nebraska it could be possible to specifically
offset a new carbon tax with reductions in property taxes, a perennial source of angst.
Naturally, more study would be required before the Unicameral would enact any such
legislation. There is also the problem of education—making people realize that climate
change is a serious issue that we must address. Even better would be a nationwide carbon
tax that could probably reduce more emissions that occur in more industrialized states.
Nevertheless, it would be helpful if Nebraska took the lead on the issue, especially with
the federal government so immoveable on environmental policy.
I find in my study that carbon taxes are most likely to exhibit the double dividend
effect when they are offset with a reduction in taxes on capital. This situation holds even
in a relatively small U.S. state like Nebraska. This is a great public policy option that
adjusts incentives for the private sector to better reflect a socially optimal equilibrium,
rather than dictating massive projects from above. The problem of climate change is
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very great. I believe that one part of the solution has to be carbon pricing and taxes on
a worldwide, or at least nationwide, scale. Additionally, the U.S. government ought to
pour funding into research on radical technologies that have the potential to make a big
difference. We have waited too long to put all of our hopes in things like wind and solar
energy. Carbon taxes, therefore, are just a piece of the puzzle, but a very important one.
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